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Many political commentators diagnose an increasing polarization of the U.S. electorate into 
two opposing camps. However, in standard spatial voting models, changes in the political 
preference distribution are irrelevant as long as the position of the median voter does not 
change. We show that media bias provides a mechanism through which political polarization 
can affect electoral outcomes. 
In our model, media firms’ profits depend on their audience rating. Maximizing profits may 
involve catering to a partisan audience by slanting the news. While voters are rational, 
understand the nature of the news suppression bias and update appropriately, important 
information is lost through bias, potentially resulting in inefficient electoral outcomes. We 
show that polarization increases the profitability of slanting news, thereby raising the 
likelihood of electoral mistakes. We also show that, if media are biased, then there are some 
news realizations such that the electorate appears more polarized to an outside observer, even 
if citizens’ policy preferences do not change. 
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Several recent books argue that most major media outlets in the U.S. report the news with a severe
bias. Depending on the author’s political stance, the deplored bias is either to the left (Goldberg
(2003), Coulter (2003)) or to the right (Alterman (2003), Franken (2003)). Media bias is often
blamed for the fact that voters’ beliefs on key policy issues are sometimes blatantly false. For
example, as Table 1 indicates, a large percentage of the U.S. population had mistaken beliefs about
facts surrounding the Iraq war. Most strikingly, these beliefs diﬀered substantially between liberals
and conservatives, indicating that these groups receive information from diﬀerent sources, and that
some of these sources bias the news by suppressing or deemphasizing certain events that could be
perceived as unfavorable by their respective audiences.





Saddam Hussein had strong links to Al-Qaeda 62% 84% 37%
Saddam Hussein helped plan and support the hijackers
who attacked the US on September 11, 2001 41% 52% 23%
Iraq had weapons of mass destruction when the US
invaded
38% 58% 16%
Relatedly, many political commentators diagnose a sharp and increasing partisan divide that
splits the U.S. electorate. For example, the Economist writes that “the 50-50 nation appears
to be made up of two big, separate voting blocks, with only a small number of swing voters in
the middle”,1 and that “America is more bitterly divided than it has been for a generation”.2
In contrast, Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2004) argue that even though partisans may be more
partisan, there is a large center of voters who are largely ambivalent or indiﬀerent and that “there
is little evidence that Americans’ ideological or policy positions are more polarized today then they
were two or three decades ago, although their choices often seem to be.”
We develop a model in which an increase in partisan behavior is not due to a fundamental change
of voter’s political preferences, but rather due to media bias. This media bias arises endogenously
as an optimal choice by proﬁt-maximizing media in response to (some) voters’ preferences. Media
bias manifests itself as suppression of information. While voters know that media are biased and
update rationally, they cannot completely recover the suppressed information. We address the
questions of whether and when media bias causes a failure of information aggregation in elections.
Even though some voters will have mistaken beliefs, it is far from obvious that the wrong electoral
outcomes will occur. For example, as documented by an extensive literature rooted in the Condorcet
Jury Theorem, democracies can achieve perfect information aggregation, even when the quality of
information of individual voters is poor (see, for example, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)).
1“On His High Horse,” Economist, November 9, 2002: 25.
2“America’s Angry Election,” Economist, January 3, 2004.
1We identify the conditions under which this suppression of news leads to electoral failures. We
show that media are more likely to be biased when some citizens are more partisan. We then
show how the suppression of information by the media can aﬀect preference intensities so that even
moderates look like partisans. Because the endogenous media bias depends on the distribution of
citizen preferences, electoral outcomes depend not only on the location of the median voter, but
also on the entire distribution.
To understand how this endogenous suppression of information can lead to electoral failure,
consider the following example. Suppose there are both conservative and liberal media outlets,
each presenting only the negative news about the opposing candidate. Applied to the the 2004
U.S. Presidential Elections, the liberal outlet would have focused on the lack of those weapons of
mass destruction that provided the rationale of the Bush administration for the Iraq war, while
a conservative outlet would have emphasized Kerry’s “ﬂip-ﬂopping,” illustrated by the widely-
quoted line by Kerry: “I voted for the 84 Billion before I voted against it.” In our model, voters
are rational and understand that their news sources are biased. Thus, even though a listener to
the conservative news source remains uninformed about the lack of WMDs in Iraq, he understands
that there may be some news that was not reported. If the realized negative news about Kerry’s
“ﬂip-ﬂopping” is more important than the unobserved (expected) negative news about Bush, then
even very moderate listeners of the conservative outlet vote for Bush. Similarly, all listeners to
the liberal outlet vote for Kerry, as long as the news about the missing WMDs is more important
than the expected, but unobserved, weakness of Kerry. In this instance, the conservative candidate
is elected if and only if the median voter listens to the conservative outlet, and his election is
ineﬃcient if and only if under complete information this voter would have considered the WMD
issue to dominate the character issue.
The fundamental source of possible electoral ineﬃciency is a problem of failing to internalize
positive externalities. While all or most voters would beneﬁt from a better-informed electorate,
each individual citizen has virtually no inﬂuence on the electoral outcome. As a consequence, the
value of news for an individual citizen is primarily given by its entertainment value, and not by its
informational value. Depending on preferences, the consumption value of news may be higher for
biased than for unbiased news. Speciﬁcally, while more moderate liberals and conservatives prefer
unbiased news, stronger partisans in both camps may favor news consistent with their ideological
predisposition. Our modeling assumptions correspond to the observation of Posner (2005): “So why
do people consume news and opinion? [...] They want to be entertained, and they ﬁnd scandals,
violence, crime, the foibles of celebrities and the antics of the powerful all mightily entertaining.
And they want to be conﬁrmed in their beliefs by seeing them echoed and elaborated by more
articulate, authoritative and prestigious voices. So they accept, and many relish, a partisan press.”
Because the preference of citizens for conﬁrmatory news is more pronounced for stronger par-
tisans, if partisans are not too extreme, media outlets compete by providing unbiased news. In
contrast, in society with extreme partisans, it can be proﬁtable for media to gear the news to one
side of the political spectrum. Thus, the desire of partisans to receive conﬁrmatory news reinforces
the externality problem so that political polarization can alter electoral outcomes.
2Our paper is related to three distinct literatures. One literature analyzes whether democratic
election aggregating information eﬃciently. Wittman (1989) argues that democracy leads to eﬃ-
cient outcomes as long as voters do not make systematic mistakes.3 In his view, elections would be
unaﬀected by media bias when voter are rational. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) and Fedder-
sen and Pesendorfer (1997) consider a common value model in which voters receive stochastically-
independent information about the state of the world. They show that information aggregation in
large electorates is asymptotically eﬃcient. Martinelli (2004) endogenizes voters’ decisions about
how much information to acquire. If marginal information acquisition costs are initially zero, then
eﬃcient outcomes arise despite the public good provision problem. In contrast to these models, in
our paper all citizens listening to the same outlet receive the same information. Even though each
individual citizen in our model receives more complete information than in the above models, all
listeners to the same media outlet receive the same information. Thus, no law of large numbers
result for perfect information aggregation applies to our model.
There is an emerging literature that investigates the sources of media bias (Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005), Baron (2004), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005)). As in our model, Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005) assume that media bias is caused by preference for conﬁrmatory news. However,
in their paper the bias can be undone by rational agents. Hence, we cannot use their approach
for our analysis. In Baron (2004) bias can arise because journalists have a preference for providing
news that is in line with their own political views. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005) introduce a model
in which media ﬁrms care about their reputation for accurately reporting news. Interestingly,
when the true state of the world is not always revealed ex-post, this reputational concern may
discourage media from reporting their information truthfully and, instead, induce them to provide
conﬁrmatory news.
In our model, we assume that media can selectively omit relevant information that conﬂicts
with their viewers’ beliefs and preferences, but they cannot “fabricate” news outright. Groseclose
and Milyo (2005) argue that news suppression is by far the more important form of media bias:
“Cases such as Jayson Blair, Stephen Glass, or the falsiﬁed memo at CBS are rare; they make
headlines when they do occur; and much of the time, they are orthogonal to any political bias.
Instead, for every sin of commission, such as those by Glass or Blair, we believe that there are
hundreds and maybe thousands of sins of omission — cases where a journalist chose facts or stories
that only one side of the political spectrum is likely to mention.” For example, the (conservative)
Media Research Center reported on June 24, 2005 that for several days the main U.S. networks did
not report on the controversy following Senator Durbin’s Guantanamo–Gulag speech, news that
was widely perceived as damaging for Durbin and the Democratic party.
Our primary goal is to determine the electoral eﬀects of media bias. There are a few empirical
papers that analyze whether media and media bias matter for voting behavior. Gerber, Karlan,
and Bergan (2006) suggests that the naive view that biased media just persuade some of their
3Wittman (2005) expands on this argument, noting that if the only voters who mistakenly believed that Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction and was behind 9/11, were those voters who would have voted for Bush anyway, then
media bias was irrelevant for the electoral outcome, and hence irrelevant from an eﬃciency perspective.
3audience to follow the journalists’ political preferences may be mistaken. In their ﬁeld experiment
Virginia voters who did not subscribe either to the Washington Post (WP) or to the Washington
Times (WT) were assigned to three groups, two of which were given a free subscription to one
of the newspapers. They ﬁnd that receiving the WP, a relatively liberal paper that endorsed the
Democratic candidate in the 2005 Virginia gubernatorial election, increased a subject’s probability
of voting for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate by 8-11% relative to the control group that
did not receive any paper. However, receiving the WT, a conservative paper that endorsed the
Republican candidate, also increased a subject’s probability of voting Democratic by 5-8% relative
to the control group. While the latter observation is inconsistent with a naive view of the eﬀects of
media bias, it is perfectly consistent with our theory of rational voters, who update after receiving
biased news.4
Our preference-based approach to modeling media bias provides a credible and tractable frame-
work of why media bias arises. However, even if media bias is due to other reasons (as in Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2005) or Baron (2004)), the analysis of the electoral eﬀects of media bias in our model
would still apply, as long as media bias leads to a loss of information that cannot be fully recovered
by voters.
Finally, our paper contributes to the spatial theory of elections, pioneered by Downs (1957).5
The central result of this literature is the median voter theorem, which shows that solely the
location of the median voter determines the electoral outcome — the distribution of voters and the
polarization of the electorate are irrelevant. In contrast, the distribution of political preferences
matters in our model, because it inﬂuences the optimal behavior of media and hence the information
of the electorate.
2 The Model
Players and Time Structure. There are 2 news media outlets, 2 candidates for a oﬃce, and a
continuum of measure one of citizens. A citizen’s political preferences are given by θ = τ +ρ, where
τ is the realization of the median voter (distributed according to cdf G), and ρ is the voter’s devia-
tion from the median (distributed according to cdf F). We assume that F and G have diﬀerentiable
symmetric density functions f and g, respectively, and that both distributions have mean zero. The
density function describing the ex-ante distribution of θ is therefore h(θ) =
R
f(θ − τ)g(τ)dτ. We
say that a voter θ < 0 is liberal while a voter θ > 0 is conservative. Each citizen knows his type
θ, but does not know either ρ or τ. Hence a citizen does not know whether or not he is decisive in
the election, and the probability of being pivotal is zero.
There are two candidates i = L,R running for oﬃce. Candidate i’s type is characterized by
(xi,qi), where xi is a policy position, and qi ∈ R is the candidate’s valence—valence is a quality such
4Della Vigna and Kaplan (2005) study the eﬀect of the the introduction of the Fox News Channel in some, but
not all communities before the 2000 U.S. presidential election and ﬁnd that, in that election, the availability of Fox
News may have increased the Republican vote share by about one half percentage point.
5For a review of this literature, see Osborne (1995).
4as integrity or ability that all citizens appreciate in a politician. We assume that policy positions
are symmetric around 0, so that 0 < xR = −xL. Citizens cannot directly observe the valence qi.
Media outlets are completely informed about the candidates’ valences, which they can — possibly
incompletely — report to their listeners.6 Let Y +
i and Y −
i be the random variables that describe
positive and negative news, respectively about candidate i, and let y+
i and y−
i be the associated
realizations.7 Candidate i’s valence is then given by qi = y+
i −y−
i . We assume that the cdfs of Y +
i
and Y −
i are continuous. To simplify the exposition we assume that E[Y +
L + Y −
R ] = E[Y −
L + Y +
R ],
i.e., the candidates have the same ex-ante expected valence.
The game extends over three stages.
Stage 1 The media outlets announce reporting strategies, specifying for every possible vector of
news realizations, the set of stories that they will report. Formally, an action by media outlet
i in stage 1 is given by a function ζi: R4
+ → {0,1}4, where 0 indicates that the news is





(0,1,1,0) indicates that for this particular realization, media outlet i reports only the negative
news about the left candidate and the positive news about the right candidate.
Stage 2 Each citizen θ chooses an outlet i to which he listens and a listening time t ≥ 0.
Stage 3 After Bayesian updating about qi, citizens vote for their preferred candidate.
Citizens’ preferences. Citizens receive utility from listening to the news and from the electoral
outcome. In principle, citizens might listen to news in order to make a better-informed electoral
choice; however, since the probability to be pivotal in the election is (essentially) zero for each
individual voter, this incentive is very small in large electorates. Rather, we assume that citi-
zens listen to the news as a consumption good: Some news is just interesting or entertaining for
citizens, and this provides suﬃcient motivation for citizens to listen to the news for some time.
In this respect, we assume that citizens, ceteris paribus, prefer to hear news that is positive for









R), where favorable news about candidate R and unfavorable
news about candidate L enter η positively, while unfavorable news about R and favorable news
about L enter negatively. Citizen θ’s “listening” utility in stage 2 is given by
u2
θ(t,y,ζ,i) = [γ + αθζi(y) · η(y) + βζi(y) · y]t − 0.5t2, (1)
6The assumption that the media are completely informed about the candidates’ valences may appear to be a strong
one, but should only be understood as the media initially having more information about valence than voters. The
objective of the model is to analyze whether the media transmit their additionally available information eﬃciently.
7We show below that the restriction to one item of positive and negative news about each candidate is without
loss of generality.
5where α,β,γ > 0, and “·” denotes the inner product of vectors.8 The parameter β captures a
citizen’s preference for “bigger” news stories, and α|θ| captures citizen θ’s preference for positive
stories about his preferred candidate and negative stories about his opponent. Hence, a strong
partisan with α|θ| > β prefers to listen to news biased in favor of his candidate, and against his
opponent, while moderates (θ ≈ 0) prefer to receive all news. Finally, γ > 0 captures the enjoyment
derived from listening to aspects of the news show that are distinct from the political news stories
themselves—sports, weather, entertainment, world and domestic news.
We assume that each citizen only listens to a single outlet for his news. While listening to
several outlets could, in principle, lead to better information, the zero probability of being pivotal
implies that listening to both outlets is generically not optimal if outlets use diﬀerent reporting
strategies (i.e., except perhaps for the one type who is indiﬀerent between the outlets). If outlets
use the same reporting strategy, then whether a citizen listens to one or both outlets is irrelevant
for his information. Hence, our assumption that citizens listen to only one outlet is eﬀectively
without loss of generality.
Citizen θ’s utility in stage 3 when candidate e is elected is
u3
θ(q1,q2,e,v) = −(θ − xe)2 + κqe, (2)
where κ > 0 captures the weight in citizen preferences on valence relative to ideology. Citizen θ’s
total utility reﬂects both his listening enjoyment and the electoral outcome, and is the weighted




where λ > 0 determines the importance of the election relative to the consumption of news pro-
grams.
Media Proﬁts. We assume that a media outlet makes its proﬁts from advertising. Advertising
proﬁts are proportional to the time citizens spend listening to outlet j. In particular, if Tj =
R
t∗
j(θ)h(θ)dθ is the aggregate listening time by j’s audience, then j’s proﬁts are equal to
Πj(T) = πTj − FC, (4)
where π > 0 is the marginal proﬁt and FC are the media outlet’s ﬁxed operating costs.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Equilibrium in the media market
Suppose that citizen θ listens to outlet j, which has a reporting strategy ζj. Citizen θ chooses his
listening time to maximize expected utility, (1). The quadratic structure of preferences implies that
8For example, if media outlet i reports only negative news about L and positive news about R, then ζi(y) =













2. If, instead, θ listens to an outlet j that reports






















6if the optimal listening time is positive, it is given by
t = E [γ + αθζi(Y ) · η(Y ) + βζi(Y ) · Y ] = γ + αθE[ζi(Y ) · η(Y )] + βE[ζi(Y ) · Y ]. (5)
Thus, only the expected news enters the decision about how long to listen to a particular media
outlet, as the listener only learns the actual news after the fact. While the actual news matters for
a citizen’s Bayesian updating, it is suﬃcient to focus on the expected news in order to determine
the equilibrium in the media market. Furthermore, (5) indicates that only the net news about each
candidate matters, which is the positive news about the candidate himself plus the negative news
about his opponent. Formally deﬁne
ZL = Y +
L + Y −
R , ZR = Y +
R + Y −
L , and ¯ z = E[ZR] = E[ZL]. (6)
Then by an appropriate choice of a reporting strategy ζ, a media outlet can achieve any arbitrary
expected net reported news 0 ≤ sL ≤ ¯ z and 0 ≤ sR ≤ ¯ z. (Formally, sL = E[ζ(Y ) · (Y +
L ,0,0,Y −
R )]
and sR = E[ζ(Y ) · (0,Y −
L ,Y +
R ,0)].) The resulting listening time is then
t = γ + αθ(sR − sL) + β(sR + sL). (7)
Note that an outlet would never simultaneously suppress both net news that favors the liberal
candidate and net news that favors the conservative. To see why, suppose by contradiction that
positive news about both candidates is suppressed, so that sL < ¯ z and sR < ¯ z. If a media outlet
increases both sL and sR by the same amount, then the second term on the right-hand side of
(7) does not change, while the third term increases. Thus, listening time and media proﬁts would
increase, a contradiction. We now state the result formally.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, each media outlet reports at least all positive news about one candi-
date and all negative news about his opponent, i.e., ζ(Y ) = (1,a(Y ),b(Y ),1) or ζ(Y ) = (a(Y ),1,1,b(Y ))
for all Y , where a(Y ),b(Y ) : Y → {0,1}.
Lemma 1 indicates that each media outlet fully reports the net news about at least one candidate.
It still allows for the possibility of partial news suppression about the opposing candidate. In
Proposition 1, we show that this is not the case, if the distribution of citizens has the following
property:
Condition 1 h0(θ) ≥ −α
βh(θ), for all θ ∈ (0,β/α).
Condition 1 stipulates that the density function does not drop oﬀ too rapidly for moderate
citizens who are close to the center of the distribution. For example, if h is normally distributed with
mean 0 and standard deviation σ then Condition 1 is satisﬁed if σ >
β





α separates moderates who prefer unbiased news from partisans. Applied to
normal distributions, Condition 1 is satisﬁed as long as all moderates are within one standard
deviation of the expected mean, i.e., there are not more than about 68% moderates. However, we
note that the condition is suﬃcient but far from necessary. Numerical analysis indicates that the
result of Proposition 1 holds for all normal distributions.
7Proposition 1 If Condition 1 holds, then in equilibrium, each media outlet chooses one of three
reporting strategies: “unbiased reporting”, ζ(Y ) = (1,1,1,1) for all Y ; “reporting biased to the
left”, ζ(Y ) = (1,0,0,1) for all Y ; or “reporting biased to the right”, ζ(Y ) = (0,1,1,0) for all Y .9
We know from Lemma 1 that each media outlet reports all net positive information for at least
one candidate. We then use Condition 1 to show that media outlet’s payoﬀ is convex in the net
news reported about the opposing candidate. As a consequence, the optimum is at a corner where
all the net news is either reported or suppressed. Because convexity is not a necessary condition
for a corner solution, the result of Proposition 1 holds more generally.
Under the conditions of Proposition 1, media outlets are either unbiased or completely biased.
It may seem that, in reality, bias on many TV channels is less stark, as even channels that are
considered to be ideologically biased often have shows that attract viewers from the opposite side
of the political spectrum. However, the relevant level of competition for our questions is not the
entire set of broadcasts, but rather competition between individual shows. For example, MSNBC
broadcasts the “Countdown” for more liberal viewers, followed by “Scarborough Country,” which
targets conservatives. Similarly, Fox News Sunday, with its panel of four conservatives and one
liberal appeals to a more Republican audience, while the immediately following program, “The
Chris Matthews Shows”, has a far more liberal panel. One can certainly not conclude from this
that channels target a centrist audience, because few viewers of one program stick around for
the other.10 Rather, the channels ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to target diﬀerent partisan audiences
at diﬀerent time slots. Thus, in practice, a biased-biased equilibrium should be interpreted as a
situation in which the vast majority of broadcasts target partisan audience, instead of the political
center.
We next characterize equilibria. From Proposition 1, a media outlet is either unbiased, left
biased, or right biased. While this gives rise to six possible conﬁgurations, asymmetric equilibria in
which both outlets are biased to the left or both outlets are biased to the right do not arise because
of the symmetric distribution of voters. For example, if the competing media outlet has a left bias,
it is more proﬁtable to choose an opposing bias to the right than the same left bias. This leaves
the following possible equilibrium conﬁgurations.
Proposition 2 For a given β, γ and distribution H(·), we can partition the set of bias preference
parameters α into three non-empty regions: a low-bias region (0,α1), a medium-bias region (α1,α2),
and a high-bias region (α2,∞), where
1. Both an unbiased-unbiased and unbiased-biased equilibria exist for α in the low-bias region.
2. Only an unbiased-biased equilibrium exists in the medium-bias region.
3. Only a biased-biased equilibrium exists in the high-bias region.
9It should be noted that this result extends to an arbitrary number of media outlets.
10Indeed, the moderator of Fox News Sunday usually forgoes inviting viewers to watch the upcoming Chris































[γ + 2β¯ z]. (9)
Central to the proof of Proposition 2 is the identity of the listener ˆ θ, who is indiﬀerent between
the two news outlets. If one outlet has a left bias and the other has a right bias then the marginal
listener is ˆ θ = 0. If, instead, one news outlet is biased, say to the right, while the other outlet is
unbiased, then listener θ = 0 strictly prefers the unbiased outlet to the biased outlet, and the same
is true for those right-of-center moderates with θ < ˆ θ =
β
α.
To understand equation (8), note that the right-hand side is the payoﬀ to an outlet that switches
from being unbiased to being biased (say to the right). The average listening time is given by
E[γ + αθZR + βZR|θ >
β
α], because only conservatives θ >
β
α listen to the right-biased outlet. To
understand the left-hand side of equation (8), note that the total listening time of two unbiased
outlets together is E[γ +αθ(ZR −ZL)+β(ZR +ZL)]. Since E[ZR] = E[ZL] = ¯ z, total media proﬁt
is therefore γ + 2β¯ z. Furthermore, it is easiest to support an equilibrium with unbiased outlets
if listeners split equally, which accounts for the coeﬃcient of 1/2. In the proof we show that the
right-hand side of equation (8) increases faster than the left-hand side when α increases. Thus,
unbiased equilibria can be supported if and only if α ≤ α1. Otherwise, if α > α1 it is optimal for
any of the outlets to deviate to biased reporting.
The left-hand side of equation (9) is the ex-ante payoﬀ of a media outlet if both outlets are
biased. If both are biased, they must be biased in opposite direction. Thus, all liberals θ < 0
listen to the liberal outlet, while all conservatives θ > 0 listen to the conservative outlet, so that
each outlet expects 50% of the citizens as listeners. Apart from the diﬀerent set of listeners, the
expression is the same as the right-hand side of (8). Now suppose the previously-liberal outlet
becomes unbiased, so that all citizens θ <
β
α tune in. Its ex-ante expected payoﬀ corresponds to
the left-hand side of (8), with the factor 1/2 replaced by F(
β
α). We show in the appendix that the
left-hand side of (9) increases faster than the right-hand side as α increases. Thus, for α > α2 it
is optimal for both outlets to be biased, while for α < α2 it is optimal for at least one outlet to
report unbiased news, and a biased-biased equilibrium cannot be supported.
It is interesting to note that the existence of the intermediate region with only a biased-unbiased
equilibrium implies that media bias is a strategic substitute for outlets and not a strategic comple-
ment. That is, suppose that both outlets are initially unbiased, but parameters change such that
one of them ﬁnds it just proﬁtable to introduce a bias. Then it is not optimal for the other outlet
to become biased as well. The argument is related to that above. When one outlet becomes biased,
say to the left, then it loses all left-of-center moderates, thereby increasing both the proﬁt of the
remaining unbiased outlet and, more importantly, its incentive to provide unbiased news—-as it
now caters to all moderate listeners.
We next show that increasing polarization increases the incentive to provide biased broadcasts
targeting partisans. To do this we ﬁrst deﬁne what it means for a society to become more politically
9polarized. More political polarization simply means that there are fewer citizens in the center and
more in the extremes.
Deﬁnition 1 Let H(θ) and ˆ H(θ) be cdfs for two diﬀerent symmetric distributions of citizens.
Then the society described by ˆ H is more polarized than the society described by H if and only if
H(θ) ≤ ˆ H(θ) for all −∞ < θ < 0 where the inequality is strict for some θ < −
β
α.
When a society becomes more polarized, the cutoﬀs α1 and α2 described in Proposition 2
decrease, because it becomes more proﬁtable for media outlets to cater to partisans. If a media
outlet remains unbiased, the increase in polarization does not aﬀect its overall listening time (i.e.,
the rating of the program). In contrast, a biased outlet is rewarded by an increase in listening time of
their partisan viewers. Consequently, as polarization increases, media outlets ﬁnd it more proﬁtable
to replace balanced discussions by one-sided presentations. For example, the show “Capital Gang”
on CNN, with a balanced roundtable was discontinued, presumably due to a lack of viewership.
Proposition 3 Suppose that a society described by ˆ H is more polarized than that by H. Then both
α1 and α2 are strictly smaller under ˆ H.
Proposition 3 reveals that partisan polarization aﬀects the composition of news reporting. This,
in turn, inﬂuences the information of the citizens, which then may impact the electoral outcome.
Thus, in contrast to almost all results in the spatial theory of voting, we show that not only the
location of the median voter (or the distribution over the location of the median), but also the
whole distribution, in particular the polarization of the electorate, matters.
3.2 Electoral Consequences of Media Bias
We now determine how media bias aﬀects electoral outcomes, and under what conditions media
bias results in electoral ineﬃciencies. Because citizens in our model are completely rational and
understand the nature of the biases, they update appropriately and then vote for the candidate
whom they prefer given their information. Hence, even citizens who listen to biased media do not
make systematic mistakes regarding the valence of their ideologically-preferred candidate and his
opponent. However, because information is incomplete due to bias, the wrong candidate may get
elected.
We deﬁne the ex-post eﬃcient choice as the candidate whose election maximizes aggregate social
welfare. Note that our deﬁnition of ex-post eﬃciency is utilitarian, because Pareto optimality alone
has no bite in our model.
Deﬁnition 2 Given the realization τ of the median voter, and the valences qi, i = L,R, candidate i






Due to the symmetry in the distribution of voters, this utilitarian deﬁnition is equivalent to to the
following:
10Lemma 2 Candidate i is the ex-post eﬃcient choice if and only if voter τ prefers candidate i, i.e.,
−(τ − xi)2 + κqi ≥ −(τ − xj)2 + κqj.
The following three propositions provide a complete classiﬁcation of all situations in which ex-post
ineﬃciencies occur. Because of the symmetry of our results, we restrict attention to the case where
the conservative candidate’s realized net news is lower than that of his liberal opponent. We can
subdivide the set of voters into intervals of voters of diﬀerent degrees of moderation. Whether or
not ineﬃciencies arise depends on the location of the median voter τ with respect to these intervals.
First, as noted in Section 2, voters in |θ| <
β
α prefer to receive all news, even news that is
negative about their preferred candidate. We refer to such voters as moderates. In contrast, more
partisan liberals or conservative have |θ| >
β
α, and prefer one-sided presentations. For example, if
the news is discussed by a roundtable of experts, then a moderate would prefer an evenly-split panel
that provides diﬀerent perspectives on an issue, while, for example, a more partisan conservative
prefers a more one-sided panel (such as Fox News Sunday).
Proposition 4 considers the case where the realized net news about both candidates exceeds
the expected net news, ¯ z, identifying when electoral ineﬃciencies occur. Recall that the net news
about candidate i consists of the positive news y+
i about i and the negative news y−
j about his
opponent. The net news about a candidate can be above average when either he has very good
news about himself, or when his opponent has skeletons in his closet. For example, if there is very
good and very bad news about the same candidate, then the resulting net news for both candidates
can be above average. Polborn and Yi (2006) argue that the negative news in election campaigns is
typically more important, because the level of possible positive news about a candidate is limited
compared to the possible downsides of scandals. If so, the case zL,zR > ¯ z may be generated more
frequently by signiﬁcant negative revelations about both candidates.
Proposition 4 Suppose that zL > zR > ¯ z. Then ex-post ineﬃciencies occur if and only if one of
the following two conditions holds.
1. Both outlets are biased and the median voter is conservative with 0 < τ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR .
2. There is an unbiased outlet, an outlet that is biased to the right, and the median voter is
conservative with
β
α < τ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR .
The expected utility gain of a listener to a biased outlet from his preferred candidate is bounded
away from zero. Moreover, marginal changes in news do not aﬀect the voting behavior of citizens
who listen to biased news outlets.
Proposition 4 indicates that there are two ways in which the wrong candidate may be elected.
The ﬁrst case applies to a suﬃciently polarized society such that both media outlets are biased
(see Proposition 3). If the median voter is slightly conservative and listens to a right-biased outlet
then he only observes zR but not zL. As a consequence, given that zL exceeds the expected net
news ¯ z of a liberal candidate, our voter concludes that candidate R is the better choice. However,
when the true net news is zL > zR, a voter who is moderately conservative, i.e., 0 < τ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR
11would prefer candidate L, if fully informed. The cutoﬀ reﬂects the relative weight κ on valence and
the policy divergence captured by xR. For example, the median voter may be primarily informed
about scandals involving the liberal candidate, and not suﬃciently informed about the even larger
problems aﬀecting the conservative candidate. In the resulting equilibrium, all citizens vote along
party lines. Moreover, marginal changes in news have absolutely no eﬀect on vote shares, because
citizens’ expected utility gain from their preferred candidate is bounded away from zero. Thus, the
net diﬀerence between zL and zR determines whether a mistake occurs.
Case 2 considers a somewhat less polarized society, where a biased-unbiased equilibrium exists.
Here, mistakes are less likely because all moderates listen to the unbiased outlet. For a mistake
to occur, the median voter must be quite conservative and the net news diﬀerence must be large
enough that the median voter would switch to the liberal candidate if he were correctly informed
about the problems of the conservative candidate. Finally, if there is very little polarization, all
media outlets are unbiased and no mistakes are made.
Proposition 4 shows that not only the location of the median voter, but also the political
polarization inﬂuences electoral outcomes. With lower political polarization, voters are better
informed and many moderates cross over to vote for the other party’s candidate. In contrast, with
more polarization voters may lack the information to make such choices. As a consequence, an
increase in the number of strong partisans on both sides results in moderates also voting along
party lines.
We now summarize key facts about recent U.S. presidential elections and relate them to our
results above. In the 2004 U.S. Presidential election, negative news about both candidates was
substantial. Liberal media emphasized the run up to the war in Iraq, while conservative news
programs emphasized Kerry’s uncertain character. According to Case 1 of Proposition 4, the
electorate should appear strongly divided, with liberals and conservatives having strong preference
intensities for their respective candidates. Moreover, the perceived preference polarization would
be based on the diﬀerent information that voters received, rather than on an increased polarization
of the underlying political preferences. Speciﬁcally, we argue the following:
1. The distribution of ideologies (θ in our model) has remained stable over the past few decades.
The fact that people appear more polarized in some recent elections therefore must be caused
by some other factor.
2. In the 2004 election, Bush and Kerry supporters held vastly diﬀerent beliefs about facts
inﬂuenced by the media, relative to their diﬀerences in core beliefs (e.g., abortion), which are
less inﬂuenced by media.
3. Voters held stronger preferences over candidates in the 2004 presidential election than in the
2000 election.
Stability of the ideological preference distribution. Many political commentators argue
that the U.S. electorate is far more polarized today than ever (see, for example, Dan Balz’s article in
the Washington Post, on March 29, 2005 and the citations from the Economist in the introduction).
12However, comparing the Gallup polls taken in the weeks before the 2000 and 2004 elections
reveals that the percentages of citizens who classiﬁed themselves as either very conservative, con-
servative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal changed only marginally. Similarly, the number of
registered voters who do not identify themselves as Democrats or Republicans has not changed
since 1997 (Pew Research Report, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=196).
More generally, Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2004) argues that the alleged increased political po-
larization is a myth and shows through the analysis of numerous surveys and opinion polls that
the distribution of political preferences in the U.S. has not changed fundamentally in the last few
decades.
Our model of media bias and its electoral eﬀects provides a framework that can reconcile the
tension between these two conﬂicting views: Diﬀerent and biased information that the two camps
of voters receive may sometimes create the appearance of a more polarized electorate even though
the underlying preference distribution did not change.
Table 2: Exit Polls, 2004 US Elections
Bush Kerry
Is Iraq part of the war on terrorism
Yes 55% 81% 18%
No 42% 11% 88%
How are things going for the U.S. in Iraq
well 44% 90% 9%
badly 52% 17% 82%
Abortion should be ...
mostly or always legal 55% 33% 67%
mostly or always illegal 42% 75% 24%
Diﬀerent beliefs about facts. Exit polls taken after the 2004 U.S. presidential election reveal
that Bush and Kerry supporters disagreed dramatically about facts relevant for the election (see
the ﬁrst two entries of Table 2). Consider, for example, the question of whether things were going
well in Iraq. In principle, the answer to this question is factual, and if all citizens had listened to
truly unbiased news reporting, there should be signiﬁcant consensus among voters in both camps.
However, while roughly 50% of voters thought the war was going well, the electorate split on this
question almost exactly along party lines. A person who believed that things were going well for
the U.S. in Iraq was ten times more likely to vote for Bush than for Kerry.
A very plausible interpretation consistent with our model is that liberals and conservatives
received information from sources with diﬀerent biases. A study by the Project for Excellence in
Journalism assessing the tone of Iraq war coverage in diﬀerent news cable news channels supports
13this view. The study found that Fox was “distinctly more positive than negative. Fully 38% of Fox
segments were overwhelmingly positive in tone, more than double the 14% of segments that were
negative. [...] On CNN, in contrast, 41% of stories were neutral in tone on the 20 days studied,
and positive and negative stories were almost equally likely – 20% positive, 23% negative.”
One could still suspect that the reason for the split along party lines in the question on Iraq
is that voters split along party lines on all major policy issues, whether or not media bias is an
issue. However, the responses on contentious hot-button issues such as abortion or the role of civil
liberties show that this is not the case. For example, the question whether or not abortion should
be legal, is a worse predictor of voting intentions than the ﬁrst two, presumably factual, questions
in Table 2. In particular, the 2004 exit polls indicate that a voter who wanted abortion to be
mostly or always illegal, was only three times as likely to be a Bush supporter.11 Similarly, 43%
of Republicans and 55% of Democrats indicated in August 2003 that is not necessary to curb civil
liberties to ﬁght terror, and 66% of Republicans and 82% of Democrats agreed that we should pay
less attention to problems overseas (Pew Research Report). Our interpretation is that preferences
about these issues are less directly aﬀected by news reporting, suggesting that news media were
responsible for the apparent polarization of the electorate.
Increased preference intensity in 2004. The Gallup polls taken before the election ask to what
degree a respondent supports a candidate. For the 2004 elections they ﬁnd stronger preferences
than in the previous three presidential elections. In particular, for the 2004 elections, 71% of
voters indicated a strong preference for their candidate. In contrast, the number is 64% for the
2000 elections,12 and the numbers were even lower in previous elections. Given that partisans are
likely to support their candidate strongly in any election, these numbers indicate that signiﬁcantly
more moderates had strong preferences in the 2004 elections. Stronger preference intensities by
moderates correspond to a smaller percentage of undecided voters. The exit polls of the 2000 and
2004 elections support this claim. In 2004, only 11% of voters were undecided until the last week,
while the corresponding number for 2000 was 18%. Similarly, the corresponding percentages for
being undecided a month before the elections were 22% in 2004 and 31% in 2000.
Higher preference intensity should also generate a high voter turnout if we endogenize partic-
ipation.13 Consistent with this view, 64% of all citizens 18-year old and above voted in the 2004
election, compared to 58% and 60%, respectively, in 1996 and 2000.
The next proposition considers the case where the liberal candidate’s net news is above average,
while the conservative candidate’s is below average. Fixing the positive news about each candidate
near the expected value, this would be the case if there are few problems with the liberal candidate,
11Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2004) notes that the diﬀerences in views on abortion of Republicans versus Democrats
would be even lower if we considered all citizens rather than actual voters, because a higher percentage of partisans
goes to the polls.
12This number is an average of the three polls that asked this question, weighted by number of respondents.
13For example, applied to a costly voting model (see Ledyard (1984), B¨ orgers (2004), Krasa and Polborn (2005)),
the increased payoﬀ diﬀerence would increase turnout.
14while the conservative candidate is involved in scandals.
Proposition 5 Suppose that zL > ¯ z > zR. Then ex-post ineﬃciencies occur if and only if one of
the following two conditions holds.
1. Both outlets are biased and the median voter is a conservative with
κ(¯ z−zR)
4xR < τ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR .
2. There is an unbiased outlet, an outlet that is biased to the right, and the median voter is a
conservative with τ > β/α and
κ(¯ z−zR)
4xR < τ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR .
Moreover, a marginal increase of zR aﬀects the voting behavior of some citizens who listen to biased
news outlets, whereas marginal changes of zL do not.
The cases in which ineﬃciencies occur are qualitatively similar to those of Proposition 4, but
mistakes are less likely, as listeners to the right-biased outlet conclude that the liberal candidate
has a higher expected valence.
In case 1, where both outlets are biased, some moderate conservatives cross over to the liberal
candidate. Mistakes can only occur if the median voter τ should, but fails to, cross over. All
moderates, θ <
κ(¯ z−zR)
4xR cross over because they expect the liberal candidate’s valence to be ¯ z.
However, because the true valence is zL > ¯ z, it would be optimal for all agents θ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR to
vote for the liberal candidate. In case 2, mistakes are even less likely because all moderates receive
news from an unbiased outlet. Hence, in addition to the conditions of case 1, the median voter τ
must also be a conservative partisan.
Finally, we consider the case where the net news about both candidates is below average. For
example, this would occur if the possible impact of negative news exceeds that of positive news,
and the realized bad news about both candidates is limited.
Proposition 6 Suppose that ¯ z > zL > zR. The election result is ex-post ineﬃcient if and only if
one of the following occurs.
Case 1 Voter τ would be better oﬀ with candidate R, but candidate L wins. This happens if and
only if one of the following conditions hold:
1. Both outlets are biased, the median voter is a conservative with
κ(zL−zR)
4xR < τ <
κ(¯ z−zR)
4xR ,
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Case 2 Voter τ would be better oﬀ with candidate L, but candidate R wins. This happens if and
only if one of the following conditions hold:
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2. There is an unbiased outlet, an outlet that is biased to the left, the median voter is liberal
with −
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Moreover, marginal changes of zL and zR always aﬀect vote shares.
The results of Proposition 6 are qualitatively diﬀerent from those of Propositions 4 and 5. First,
biased information now aﬀects voting behavior for supporters of the candidate with the better net
news, i.e., the liberal candidate in our parametrization. The reason is that liberals hear very
little bad news about the conservative candidate, and may therefore be tempted to cross over.
However, from a social perspective too many liberals may cross over, because they do not know
that their own candidate’s negative news, which they suspect is being suppressed by the media,
is actually insigniﬁcant. For the same reason too many conservatives cross over as well. The fact
that the liberal candidate is better than the conservative candidate does not guarantee that more
conservatives than liberals cross over, so that mistakes can occur.
In Case 1, from the median voter τ’s perspective, the valence diﬀerence between the two can-
didates is smaller than his preference for the ideologically-closer candidate. However, the liberal
candidate wins because more conservatives cross over to vote for the liberal candidate than vice
versa. In Case 2, from τ’s perspective, the valence diﬀerence exceeds his ideological preference, but
the better candidate loses.
Again, properties of the distribution other than the median inﬂuence the electoral outcome.
However, in contrast to the cases discussed in Propositions 4 and 5, we now see a more ﬂuid
center in which moderates cross party lines. An outside political observer may conclude that the
candidates have similar valences, and that voters cross over because they are not inspired by their
own candidate.
We can interpret the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, where negative news about both candidates
was not very signiﬁcant, in the context of Proposition 6. In such a scenario, we would expect
signiﬁcant cross-over voting. Following Proposition 4 we have already provided evidence for lower
preference intensities and later decision making in the 2000 elections, which suggests that citizens
were more likely to cross over.
The prediction of Proposition 6 also matches the empirical result of Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan
(2006). They conducted an experiment during the 2005 Virginia gubernatorial election in which
voters without prior subscription to either the (relatively) liberal Washington Post (WP) or the
conservative Washington Times (WT) received a free subscription to one of the papers. They
ﬁnd that both voters who received the WP and those who received the WT were more likely to
vote for the Democratic candidate for governor than a control group who received neither paper.14
14Democratic vote share among readers of the WP increased by 8-11% (depending on the number of other control
16In contrast, the type of subscription did not have any sizable (or signiﬁcant) eﬀect on how people
describe themselves as liberals or conservatives. This shows that a simplistic view of media bias (i.e.,
voters are irrational and easily inﬂuenced by biased media) is inconsistent with the data. Gerber,
Karlan, and Bergan (2006) write that “the Democratic candidate for Governor was a conservative
leaning Democrat who received a relatively balanced treatment in the [Washington] Times.” In the
language of our model, there appear to have been little negative news reported on the Democrat,
so that rational voters who expect a right bias from the WT are naturally more inclined to vote
for that candidate (i.e., they expect the candidate to be above average, since they expect some
positive news to be suppressed).
Della Vigna and Kaplan (2005) analyze whether the cable channel Fox News inﬂuenced voter
behavior in the 2000 U.S. presidential election, using variations in the introduction of that channel
in diﬀerent communities. While they ﬁnd a small positive eﬀect on the Republican vote share,15 our
model implies that their result should also not be interpreted as evidence of irrational voters who
do not take bias into account when updating about candidates. The electoral eﬀects of media bias
always depends on the information that the media can reveal about the candidates. The realization
of the information determines whether media bias is helpful or counterproductive for the favored
candidate of a news outlet.
3.3 Platform Choice
In our model, a candidate’s platform is exogenous. We now discuss how electoral outcome are
aﬀected, if candidate i has some ability to move his platform from xi. Rather than completely
endogenizing candidate position, which would result in signiﬁcant analytical challenges, we use a
simplistic approach that nevertheless provides us with important insights. In particular, we suppose
that an unforeseen opportunity arises for candidates to change their policy positions after the news
about a candidate has been revealed. The question is whether such policy changes may aﬀect the
electoral outcome.
First, consider a case like the 2000 Presidential elections, where Proposition 6 predicts signiﬁ-
cant cross-over voting. In such a scenario, a shift in platform xi immediately impacts vote share.
In particular, emphasizing policy positions that move the candidate close to the center are advan-
tageous. As Brownstein comments,16 “In the past few months, presumptive Republican nominee
George W. Bush appears to have been reading from the Democratic Leadership Council playbook
more closely than Gore. On a series of major issues, Bush has embraced the exact position taken
by the DLC and its congressional allies.” For example, a key part of Bush’s 2000 platform was
education, which is traditionally considered a Democratic issue. In fact, the 2000 exit polls reveal
variables in the empirical speciﬁcation), while the eﬀect was 5-8% in the WT group. In the regression with the most
controls and dependent variable “voted for Democrat”, the coeﬃcients of the variables WP and WT are 0.114 and
0.074, respectively, both with a standard deviation of 0.046.
15In a previous version of the paper, they found a very small and possibly negative eﬀect on the Republican vote
share.
16Los Angeles Times, April 17, 2000.
17that, of the voters who indicated that education was the issue that mattered most, 52% voted
for Gore versus 44% for Bush. In contrast, in the 1996 exit polls, 78% of these voters supported
Clinton, and only 16% voted for Dole. This suggests that Bush’s move to the center, by adopting
a traditionally Democratic issue, successfully induced some voters to cross over.
Now consider a case like the 2004 Presidential elections in the context of Propositions 4 or 5. As
explained above, all citizens θ > 0 believe that, if the conservative candidate is elected, their net-
beneﬁt is strictly bounded away from zero. The same is true for supporters of the liberal candidate.
Thus, small, and possibly even larger, platform changes will not aﬀect vote shares. Hence, attempts
to adapt a campaign message to win over moderates are likely to fail. Rather, when all voters hold
strong electoral views, devoting resources to increasing turnout of core supporters may be decisive.
In fact, most political commentators attributed the Republican win in 2004 to their superior voter
mobilization eﬀort.
In a comment written two days before the 2004 elections, Suellentrop (2004) writes: “The
secret of Bill Clinton’s campaigns and of George W. Bush’s election in 2000 was the much-maligned
politics of small diﬀerences: Find the smallest possible majority (well, of electoral votes, for both
men) that gets you to the White House. In political science, something called the median voter
theorem dictates that in a two-party system, both parties will rush to the center looking for that
lone voter – the median voter – who has 50.1 percent of the public to the right (or left) of him.
Win that person’s vote, and you’ve won the election.” In contrast, Suellentrop’s expectation for
the 2004 election was that Bush’s political strategist Karl Rove made a fatal mistake. “Bush’s
campaign — and his presidency — have appealed almost entirely to the base of the Republican
Party...However, the early indications are that Rove’s repudiation of centrist politics will backﬁre.
Rove has tried to use the Bush campaign to disprove the politics of the median voter. It was as
big a gamble as any of the big bets President Bush has placed over the past four years.” It appears
that Rove got it right this time too.
In summary, our model predicts that the incentive for political moderation is minimal when
there is signiﬁcant negative news about both candidates. Rather, what matters here is turning out
core supporters, and moderation may also not be helpful for this purpose. In contrast, if there is
little negative news about both candidates, then policies matter primarily, so that appealing to the
median voter is the winning strategy.
3.4 Increased Media Competition and Electoral Eﬀects
Now suppose that competition in the media market increases because of deregulation or changes
in information technology resulting in lower ﬁxed costs. Interestingly, increased competition can
be either beneﬁcial or harmful. In particular, if competition increases in a setting where media are
biased, then unbiased news may provide a way for a new entrant to diﬀerentiate itself. That is,
we get a constellation with biased outlets on the left, biased outlets on the right and an unbiased
outlet for the middle. Again, an ex-post ineﬃcient candidate choice can occur if voter τ listens to
a biased outlet, i.e., τ > |
β
α|. However, since moderates listen to unbiased news, the probability of
18a mistake decreases.
Increased competition can also have a detrimental eﬀect on media bias. In particular, suppose
we start with an electorate that is just not suﬃciently polarized to make media bias optimal, and a
third outlet enters the market. This outlet may ﬁnd it in its interest to distinguish itself by oﬀering
biased news, rather than unbiased reporting. For example, if the outlet reports with a conservative
slant, it will attract all listeners θ >
β
α, while, with unbiased reporting, it does not distinguish itself
from the other outlets. This, in turn, may induce an existing outlet to slant its news to the left.
As Posner observed, “The rise of the conservative Fox News Channel caused CNN to shift to the
left. CNN was going to lose many of its conservative listeners anyway, so it made sense to increase
its appeal to its remaining viewers, by catering more assiduously to their political preferences.”
In summary, increased media entry can either increase or decrease electoral mistakes. If a
society is not very polarized and media competition is limited, then reporting will be unbiased,
and no mistakes occur. If competition is increased, then it may be optimal for some outlets to be
biased, and the wrong candidate may get elected. In contrast, if we start with a very polarized
society then initially all outlets are biased. If competition is increased, then we would see the
reverse of Posner’s argument, i.e., it is optimal for some media outlet to cater to the political center
by providing unbiased news. This, in turn, will lower the probability of electoral mistakes.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we provide an integrated model of media bias and its consequences for information
aggregation in elections. In our model, partisan preferences for biased news may make it optimal
for news media to pick sides and bias their reporting in a way that favors one candidate over his
competitor. If media bias occurs, listeners to the liberal or conservative news outlet are incompletely
informed about facts that are unfavorable for “their” candidate. Even if citizens are completely
rational and take media bias into account, they cannot recover all of the missing information, which
can lead to the election of the wrong candidate.
Polarization of the electorate makes it more proﬁtable for media to provide biased broadcasts
that appeal to more partisan audiences. Thus, in a more polarized a society, more voters receive
their news from biased sources, which implies that not only the location of the median voter, but
also the political polarization of society aﬀects electoral outcomes.
We characterize the types of electoral mistakes that can occur due to media bias, depending
on the nature of news available about candidates. For example, if both candidates are plagued by
scandals (and this is the only signiﬁcant information), then liberals hear about the conservative
candidate’s scandals and vice versa. As a result, liberals have a strong preference for the liberal
candidate and conservatives for the conservative candidate. From an eﬃciency perspective, there
is too much voting along party lines, and marginal changes of news or policy moderation by the
candidates do not win votes. In contrast, if there is less extreme news about both candidates, then
moderates have weak preferences, and there can be too much cross-over voting from an eﬃciency
point of view. In this case, both marginal changes of news and policy moderation aﬀect vote shares.
19The fundamental reason for the ineﬃciency in electoral outcomes is that voters choose to listen
to biased media. This eﬀect is likely to be quite stable, even though the population as a whole would
be much better oﬀ if media reported unbiased news. In principle, voters could become completely
informed even with two biased media, by listening to both. However, few voters are likely to take
advantage of this opportunity because of a fundamental positive externality problem: Each voter
has only an inﬁnitesimal chance of being pivotal and, even if he becomes informed and is pivotal,
he receives only a very small fraction of the social beneﬁts. The standard economic response to
a positive externality is likely to fail, because a subsidy to news outlets for providing unbiased
reporting may be diﬃcult to implement. The best option for society may therefore be to foster a
culture in which citizen appreciate learning about both sides of a political debate.
We conclude by discussing two important issues concerning the model’s robustness. First,
unless both media provide unbiased news, each outlet gets an interval of political preference types
as listeners. For example, if an outlet provides news biased to the right, then there is a cutoﬀ such
that all citizens with political preferences to the right of that cutoﬀ listen to this outlet, but no one
else does. In practice, listener separation is less extreme. For example, some people may like to be
informed about the opposing point of view on an issue, or may have idiosyncratic preferences for
a particular outlet, unrelated to their political preferences. In this case, a right-biased outlet will
not have an exclusively, just a predominantly, conservative audience. How does this change our
results?
Consider, for example, Case 1 of Proposition 4. Those liberals who listen to the conservative
outlet are now informed about the liberal candidate’s weakness, instead of the conservative can-
didate’s weakness. Consequently, some moderates among those diﬀerently-informed liberals cross
over to vote for the conservative candidate. The same applies to conservatives who listen to the
liberal outlet. In Case 1 of Proposition 4, the liberal candidate’s net valence exceeds the conser-
vative’s, more liberally-informed conservatives cross over than do conservatively-informed liberals.
Hence, the probability of a mistake is reduced, albeit only slightly, since cross-over of heterodox
partisans occurs in both directions and so the net ﬂow may be small. Thus, our results remain
qualitatively unaﬀected, as long as our assumption that citizens prefer conﬁrmatory news holds for
a suﬃciently large share of the population.
Second, our model assumes a symmetric distribution of θ. This assumption is largely for
technical convenience, and it is straightforward, albeit tedious to extend our analysis to asymmetric
distributions. Moreover, Propositions 4 to 6 characterize electoral mistakes, given a particular
realization of τ. Some of these mistakes occur when |τ| is large, indicating that these mistakes are
even more likely in a society where the expected median voter is a partisan. For example, in a
state like Utah where the median voter τ is conservative, the liberal candidate could only win if
the electorate learns very bad news about the conservative candidate. Moreover, if a large majority
of citizens is quite conservative, then it is very attractive for media to adopt a conservative bias,
so that the negative news about the conservative candidate may not reach the median voter. As
a consequence, in a society where the expected median voter is a partisan, media bias may matter
even more than in our symmetric environment.
205 Appendix
In this Appendix, we normalize the expected net positive news for the left and the right candidate
(if everything is reported) to 1 (i.e., EY [Y +
R +Y −
L ] = E[Y +
L +Y −
R ] = 1). This economizes on notation
and is without loss of generality, because we can adjust the parameters α,β,γ of the utility function
accordingly.
Let si,L and si,R be the net expected news reported by media outlet i about candidates L and
R, respectively. That is, si,L equals the expected value of the positive news that is reported on
candidate L plus the negative news about candidate R. Formally, if we denote the `th component
of ζi by ζi,` then si,L = E[ζi,1(Y )Y +
L +ζi,4(Y )Y −
R ] and si,R = E[ζi,2(Y )Y −
L +ζi,3(Y )Y +
R ]. Note that
si,k can be chosen by media outlet i to be any number between 0 and 1 (given our normalization
of E[Y +
L ] + E[Y −
R ] or E[Y +
R ] + E[Y −
L ]), respectively, by an appropriate choice of ζi.
Proof of Lemma 1. See text.
Lemma 3 Suppose media outlet i and j’s strategies are given by sL,i = sL,j = 1. Then sR,i,sR,j ∈
{0,1}, i.e., both outlets are unbiased or maximally biased.
Proof of Lemma 3. First suppose that sR,i 6= sR,j. Then without loss of generality we can
assume that sR,i < sR,j. Then citizen ˆ θ who is indiﬀerent between the two outlets would have the
same listening time. (7) therefore implies that ˆ θ is the solution to αˆ θ(sR,j − 1) + β(1 + sR,j) =
αˆ θ(sR,i − 1) + β(1 + sR,i). Solving this equation yields ˆ θ = −β/α. Moreover, since sR,i < sR,j
(i.e., outlet i reports less positive net news about the conservative candidate) all θ < ˆ θ listen to
outlet i, while all θ > ˆ θ listen to j. Because ˆ θ does not vary with sR,i, it is optimal for outlet i to
set sRi = 0, as it increases the listening time of all citizens θ < ˆ θ. Similarly, it follows that outlet j
should choose sR,j = 1.
Now suppose by way of contradiction that 0 < sR,i = sR,j < 1. Without loss of generality
assume that j’s expected proﬁts E[πj] are less than or equal to i’s. If outlet j increases sR,j to 1
then we can again conclude that all citizens θ > −
β
α listen to outlet j. Otherwise, if sR,j is reduced
to 0, all citizens θ < −
β






















[γ + αθ(sR,j − 1) + β(1 + sR,j)]dH(θ). (11)




[γ + αθ(sR,j − 1) + β(1 + sR,j)]dH(θ) = E[πi] + E[πj],
which contradicts the assumption that outlet j’s proﬁt do not exceed those of outlet i. This
contradiction proves the Lemma.
21Lemma 4 Suppose media outlet i and j’s strategies are given by sL,i = 1, sR,i = x, and sR,j = 1,
sL,j = y. Then Condition 1 implies that the media outlet’s payoﬀ is convex in x.
Proof of Lemma 4. Without loss of generality consider the case where the set of listeners is





(2 − x − y)
. (12)















Media outlet i chooses x to maximize its aggregate listening time:
Z ˆ θ
−∞
[γ + αθ(x − 1) + β(1 + x)]h(θ)dθ. (14)
Taking the derivative with respect to x yields
Z ˆ θ(x)
−∞
[αθ + β]h(θ)dθ +
∂ˆ θ
∂x
[γ + αˆ θ(x − 1) + β(1 + x)]h(ˆ θ). (15)














(2 − x − y)2
2





(2 − x − y)2
2
[γ + αˆ θ(x − 1) + β(1 + x)]h0(ˆ θ).
(16)
After substituting ˆ θ, the sum of the ﬁrst and third term is
β2
α
4(1 − y)2h(ˆ θ)
(2 − x − y)3 (1 + x) > 0.




(2 − x − y)3[γ + αˆ θ(x − 1) + β(1 + x)][h(ˆ θ) +
β(1 − y)
α(2 − x − y)
h0(θ)]. (17)
The ﬁrst term in square brackets is the listening time of the marginal viewer (and hence positive).
Further, (1 − y)/(2 − x − y) < 1. Thus, (1) guarantees that the second term in square brackets is
also nonnegative. Hence, the proﬁt function is convex.
Proof of Proposition 1. The result follows immediately from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. In
particular, the convexity of payoﬀs implies that the optimum is at a boundary.
22Lemma 5 Suppose there are two media outlets, i = 1,2. Then there exist exactly three types of
equilibria.
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Proof of Lemma 5. First, we show that both media outlet are not biased to the left. If both
are biased to the left then the set of all listeners must be an interval, (−∞, ˆ θ]. Without loss of
generality suppose that media 1’s expected proﬁt E[π1] are less or equal to those of media 2 and
hence
E[π1] ≤ 0.5H(ˆ θ)[γ + (αEΘ[−Θ|Θ < ˆ θ] + β)2¯ Y ]. (21)
Now suppose that outlet 1 provides news that is biased to the right. Then the set of listeners is
[0,∞), so that proﬁts are
E[˜ π1] = H(0)

γ + (αEΘ[Θ|Θ ≥ 0] + β)2¯ Y

. (22)
Note that 0.5 ≥ 0.5H(ˆ θ), with a strict inequality if ˆ θ is in the support of H. Furthermore,
EΘ[Θ|Θ ≥ 0] ≥ EΘ[−Θ|Θ < ˆ θ], with a strict inequality for ˆ θ > 0. Thus, (21) and (22) imply that
E[˜ π1] > E[π1], i.e., news outlet 1 has proﬁtable deviation, a contradiction. Similarly, both outlets
cannot be biased to the right. As a consequence, only the three cases listed in the Proposition
remain.
Now suppose that both outlets have opposing biases. In equilibrium it must be the case that
no outlet wants to deviate by oﬀering unbiased news. Because of symmetry it is suﬃcient to
only consider deviations by the news outlet that is biased to the left. In equilibrium, this news
outlet’s proﬁt is given by the left-hand side of (18). This follows by taking the expectation over
consumer demand given by (5). Note that H(0) is the mass of the set of all listeners θ < 0, and
EΘ[Θ|Θ ≤ 0] = −EΘ[Θ|Θ ≥ 0] is the average listener to the news outlet. If the news outlet decides





because the expected value of all news items are equal. Thus, the payoﬀ from oﬀering biased news
is given by the right-hand side of (18), which indicates that (18) is necessary. The condition is also
suﬃcient because becoming unbiased is the only possibly optimal deviation.
Next, suppose that both outlets are unbiased. Let Si, i = 1,2 be the set of listeners. Without
loss of generality assume that the mass of S1 (denoted by P(S1)) is less or equal to that of S2.
23Thus, P(S1) ≤ 0.5. The payoﬀ of news outlet 1 is then P(S1)

γ + 4β ¯ Y

, since the coeﬃcient of
α disappears for the same reason as above. Now, suppose that the news outlet deviates to a right
bias. Then its listeners are all citizens θ ≥ β/α. The news outlet’s payoﬀ is therefore given by
the right-hand side of (19). To have an equilibrium, P(S1)

γ + 4β ¯ Y

must therefore be greater or
equal to the right-hand side of (19). Because P(S1) ≤ 0.5 = H(0), it follows that (19) is necessary.
Suﬃciency follows by, for example, choosing S1 = {θ < 0} and S2 = {θ ≥ 0}.
Now suppose that one outlet is biased and the other is unbiased. Suppose the biased news
outlet deviates and becomes unbiased. Then the following is an equilibrium in the subgame: The
original biased media outlet receives all listeners, and the deviating outlet receives no listeners. As a
consequence, the deviation lowers proﬁts. It is therefore suﬃcient to ensure that that the unbiased
outlet does not deviate by becoming biased. This condition is given by (20) and the derivation
mirrors that of the other constraints.
Proof of Proposition 2. If follows immediately that if (18) is violated then (20) must hold, and
vice versa. Thus, an equilibrium with a biased and an unbiased media exists if no equilibrium with











γ + 4β ¯ Y

= 0. (23)






























4¯ y − H(0)2¯ y > 0,
because the coeﬃcient of α0





≥ H(0). Thus, α1 is strictly
increasing in β. It follows immediately that a biased-biased equilibrium occurs if α > α1 because
the right-hand side of (18) is decreasing in α, whereas the left-hand side is increasing in α.
Next, we deﬁne α2 as the value of α where (19) holds with equality. The derivatives of
H(0)



















with respect to α and β are given by
∂
∂α












































≤ H(0). Thus, α2 is strictly
increasing in β and an unbiased-unbiased equilibrium exists for all α ≤ α2.
It remains to prove that α2 < α1. Suppose that α = α2 so that (24) equals zero. It suﬃces
show that





[γ + 4β¯ y] < 0 (25)
24Because (24) is zero, we can subtract the expression from (25) to get
2¯ y
h



























































θh(θ)dθ − (H(x) − H(0))x < 0,
for x > 0. Note that ψ(0) = 0. Furthermore,
ψ0(x) = xh(x) − xh(x) − (H(x) − H(0)) = −H(x) + H(0) < 0,
because x > 0. Thus, ψ(x) < 0, which implies that (26) is strictly negative and hence (18) is
violated. Thus, α = α2 > α1.
Proof of Proposition 3. First consider equation (8). The left-hand side is independent of H




α) and 1 − ˆ H(
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) imply that the
right-hand side of equation (8) is higher for ˆ H than for H. As a consequence, α1 is lower for ˆ H.
The proof for α2 is similar.
Proof of Lemma 2. Note that (τ−xi)2+κqi ≥ (τ−xj)2+κqj if and only if τ2−2τxi+κqi ≥ τ2−
2τxj+κqj, because x2
i = x2









(θ−xj)2f(θ)dθ+τ2−2τxj+κqj, which is equivalent
to −
R
(τ + θ − xi)2f(θ)dθ + κqi ≥ −
R
(τ + θ − xj)2f(θ)dθ + κqj, i.e., the selection of candidate i
is eﬃcient.
Proof of Proposition 4. If both outlets are unbiased, then τ’s vote is decisive and therefore his
most preferred candidate is elected. Lemma 2 implies that the choice is eﬃcient.
25Now suppose there are two biased outlets. Consider a liberal citizen θ > 0. Then θ only
receives the net news about the liberal candidate. He assigns the average net news realization ¯ z to
the conservative candidate. Because (θ−xL)2+κ(zL−¯ z) > (θ−xR)2, we get (θ−xL)2+κEθ[qL] >
(θ − xR)2 + κEθ[qR], where Eθ[·] is the expectation of citizen θ conditional on the information
received from the left-biased news outlet. Because zL > ¯ z this inequality is strict even when θ = 0,
i.e., liberals believe to be signiﬁcantly better with the liberal candidate. Similarly, zR > ¯ z implies
that conservatives believe to be signiﬁcantly better with conservative candidate. Thus, τ’s vote
is again decisive: If τ > 0 then the liberal candidate wins, otherwise, if τ < 0 the conservative
candidate is elected.
If τ < 0 no electoral mistakes occur, because zL > zR. Now suppose that τ < 0. It follows
immediately that τ prefers candidate L if and only if τ ≥
κ(zL−zR)
4xR . Thus, Lemma 2 implies that a
mistake occurs if and only if 0 < τ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR .
If the outlet on the right is biased and the other outlet is unbiased, then τ can only choose the
wrong candidate if he listens to the biased outlet, i.e., if τ > β/α and if τ would prefer candidate
L if he knew L’s valence zL, i.e., if τ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR . If the outlet on the left is biased, then no mistake
can occur.
Proof of Proposition 5. Again, if both outlets are unbiased, then the electoral choice is
eﬃcient. Now, suppose both outlets are biased. As in the proof of Proposition 4, zL > ¯ z implies
that liberals θ < 0 believe to be signiﬁcantly better oﬀ with the liberal candidate. Now, however,
conservatives observe net news zR < ¯ z about their candidate, and thus expect a better net news ¯ z
about the liberal candidate. As a consequence, some conservatives vote for the liberal candidate.
Straightforward algebra reveals that this is true for all conservatives 0 ≤ θ <
κ(¯ z−zR)
4xR . However,
as the liberal candidate’s net news zL > ¯ z too few conservatives cross over. In particular, if a
conservative knew zL, then he would vote for the liberal candidate if and only if θ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR .
Thus, an electoral mistake occurs if and only if
κ(¯ z−zR)
4xR < τ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR .
Finally, suppose there is a biased and an unbiased outlet. If the biased outlet is biased to the
left then all liberals will correctly vote for the liberal candidates. Thus, mistakes could only occur
if the biased outlet is biased to the right. Similar to above it follows that
κ(¯ z−zR)
4xR < τ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR
must hold for a mistake to occur. In addition, τ must listen to the biased outlet, i.e., τ >
β
α.
Proof of Proposition 6. Again, if both outlets are unbiased, then the electoral choice is
eﬃcient. Now suppose both outlets are biased. As in the proof of Proposition 5 it follows that
all citizens 0 < θ <
κ(¯ z−zR)
4xR vote for candidate L. Similarly, zL < ¯ z implies that all citizens
0 > θ > −
κ(¯ z−zL)
4xR cross over and vote for candidate R. As a result, citizen θ votes for candidate
L if and only if θ < −
κ(¯ z−zL)
4xR or 0 < θ <
κ(¯ z−zR)












− F(−τ) > 0.5. Basic algebra reveals that citizen τ
prefers candidate L if τ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR . Thus, Lemma 2 implies an ex-post ineﬃciency if τ >
κ(zL−zR)
4xR .
26Finally, note that τ >
κ(¯ z−zR)
4xR cannot hold. Otherwise, the symmetry of f(·) implies that candidate
R wins. Thus,
κ(zL−zR)
4xR < τ <
κ(¯ z−zR)
4xR .












F(−τ) < 0.5. Citizen τ would prefer candidate L if τ <
κ(zL−zR)
4xR . Note that we must have
τ > −
κ(¯ z−zL)
4xR , else the symmetry of f(·) implies that candidate L wins. This provides the second
condition of the Proposition.
We now consider the case of an unbiased and a right-biased outlet. The argument is similar to
the ﬁrst part of the proof, except that ineﬃcient choices can now only occur if τ listens to a biased
outlet, i.e., τ >
β
α, and citizen τ is better oﬀ with candidate R, i.e., τ >
κ(zL−zR)






4xR . Then all citizens θ <
β
α vote for candidate L. Similarly,
θ <
κ(¯ z−zR)
4xR who listen to the biased outlet, i.e., θ ≥
β
α also vote for L. Thus, the symmetry of
the distribution implies that candidate L is elected if
β
α < τ <
κ(¯ z−zR)
4xR , but τ is better oﬀ with



























4xR < τ <
κ(¯ z−zL)
4xR ,
resulting in an ex-post ineﬃcient electoral outcome.
Finally, suppose there is a biased outlet to the left and an unbiased outlet. Ineﬃciencies can
only occur if τ <
β
α, so that the median voters listens to the biased outlet, and τ > −
κ(¯ z−zL)
4xR so
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